

Towards a New Generation of Probabilistic Safety Assessment Models and Tools.

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One Observation, Two Questions

The observation:

Software and control mechanisms become ubiquitous in nowadays technical systems.


The two questions:

1. Are current modeling technologies for probabilistic risk/safety analysis, e.g. fault trees, still suitable to assess risks in new generations of systems?
2. Can we use the new capacities provided by information technologies to improve the probabilistic risk/safety analysis process?

Agenda

- (R)evolution in Reliability Engineering
- The S2ML+X Family of Languages
- The Dialectic of Expressive Power and Computational Complexity
- Model Synchronization
- Wrap-Up

Issues with Current Probabilistic Safety Analyses



- Combinatorial models (fault trees, reliability block diagrams, event trees) lack of expressive power to represent faithfully reconfigurations, control mechanisms, time dependencies...;
- States/events models (Markov chains, stochastic Petri nets) lack of structure;
- All are very distant from system specifications, making model hard to author, to share with stakeholders and to maintain through the life-cycle of systems.

(R)evolution in Reliability Engineering

Today:

Mechanical systems



Recording
of failures

Local
reliability databases



$$\lambda = 1.23e-6$$

Parametric
distributions

Ad-hoc models,
e.g. fault trees



Tomorrow:



Health
monitoring




Sensors




Distributed

health condition databases



Learned
distributions



Behavioral models


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Characteristics of Behavioral Models


Behavior + Architecture = Model

- Any modeling language is the combination of a **mathematical framework** to describe the behavior and a **structuring paradigm** to organize the model.
- The choice of the **suitable mathematical framework** depends on which aspect of the system we want to study
- Structuring paradigms** are to a very large extent **independent** of the chosen mathematical framework.



The S2ML+X Promise

S2ML (System Structure Modeling Language): a coherent and versatile set of **structuring constructs** for any behavioral modeling language.



- The **structure of models** reflects the **structure of the system**, even though to a **limited extent**.
- **Structuring** helps to design, to debug, to share, to maintain and to align heterogeneous models.

Models as Scripts

The **model "as designed"** is a script to build the **model "as assessed"**.

```
domain WF {WORKING, FAILED} WORKING<FAILED;


operator Series arg1 arg2 =
  return if state1==WORKING and state2==WORKING then WORKING else FAILED;

class Component
  WF state(init = WORKING);
  WF in, out(reset = WORKING)
  probability state FAILED = (exponentialDistribution lambda (missionTime));
  parameter Real lambda = 1.0e-3;
  assertion
    out := Series(in, state);
end
```

Complex models can be built using **libraries** of **reusable modeling components** and **modeling patterns**.

S2ML + Stochastic Boolean Equations


Enhancing classical **reliability models** (fault trees, reliability block diagrams) with the **expressive power of object-orientation** at **no algorithmic cost**



```
Line1.in := in;  
Line1.P.in := Line1.in;  
Line1.P.out := Line1.P.in and not Line1.P.failed;  
...
```

```
class Pump  
    extends RepairableUnit  
    ...  
end  
  
block System  
    block Line1  
        Pump P;  
        ...  
    end  
    clones Line1 as Line2;  
    ...  
end
```

XFTA 2 + XFTA Book




XFTA 2:

- Calculation engine for fault trees and related models.
- Input language: S2ML+SBE
- State of the art assessment algorithms: as of today most efficient calculation engine
- Calculation of all usual risk indicators:
 - Top event probability
 - Importance factors
 - Sensitivity analyses
 - Approximation of system reliability
 - Safety integrity levels
- Free of use, including for commercial purposes.

AltaRica 3.0 (S2ML + Guarded Transitions Systems)

Guarded Transitions Systems:

- Are a probabilistic Discrete Events System formalism.
- Are a compositional formalism.
- Generalize existing mathematical framework.
- Take the best advantage of existing assessment algorithms.



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Classes of Modeling Languages

Combinatorial Formalisms

- Fault Trees
- Event Trees
- Reliability Block Diagrams
- Finite Degradation Structures

States Automata

- Markov chains
- Dynamic Fault Trees
- Stochastic Petri Nets
- ...

Process Algebras

- Agent-based models
- Process algebras
- Python/Java/C++
- ...

Expressive power

States

States + transitions

Deformable systems

Complexity of assessments

#P-hard but reasonable
polynomial approximation

PSPACE-hard

Undecidable

Difficulty to design, to validate and to maintain models

Best in Class Modeling Languages

Combinatorial Formalisms

Boolean models:

- Stochastic Boolean Equations
- S2ML+SBE
- XFTA

Multistate systems:

- Finite degradation structures
- S2ML+FDS
- Emmy (proof of concept)

States Automata

- Guarded Transition Systems
- S2ML+GTS = AltaRica 3.0
- AltaRica Wizard

Process Algebras


- Stochastic Process Algebras
- S2ML+SPA = Systema
- Systema Simulator (proof of concept)

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Model Diversity

Models are designed by **different teams** in **different languages** at **different levels of abstraction**, for **different purposes**, making **different approximations**. They have also **different maturities**.




complexity → simplicity

The **diversity** of models is **irreducible**.

Model Synchronization

Abstraction + Comparison = Synchronization



How to agree on disagreements?

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Wrap-Up & Conclusion

- "Traditional" modeling approaches in reliability engineering are **no longer sufficient**:
 - Because the **systems** we are dealing with are **more complex**.
 - Because **new information technologies** open **new opportunities**.
 - Because **reliability models** should be **integrated** with models from other engineering disciplines.
- **Huge benefits** can be expected from a full-scale deployment of model-based systems engineering. However, this requires:
 - To set up solid **scientific foundations** for **models engineering**.
 - To **bring to maturity** some **key technologies**.
- The **biggest challenge** is to **train new generation of engineers**:
 - With skills and competences in **discrete mathematics** and **computer science**, and
 - With skills and competences in **system thinking**, and
 - With skills and competences in **specific application domains**.